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SECRECY AND THE SUPREME COURT: JUDICIAL
INDISCRETION AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS
By PETER G. FIsH*
INTRODUCTION
Of America's political institutions, the United States Supreme Court
is the most remote and insulated. Its public work consists of little more
than the oral presentations made before it by counsel for contending
parties and of the written opinions penned by one or more of its mem-
bers. Deliberations on individual cases, however, are held in the confer-
ence room of the Court, far from the public's gaze. There, the Judges
ring down the "Purple Curtain" and consider pending cases in the
utmost secrecy. Only the members of the Court are present; no record
of the discussions is made; no messenger intrudes on their proceedings;
no unauthorized person has access to the printed opinions until released
by the Court itself. Absolute secrecy prevails, and "judicial lockjaw"
characterizes the public responses of Justices to inquiries about intra-
Court proceedings.
The rationale for this security-conscious atmosphere relates to the
nature of the Supreme Court as a legal and political institution. "Before
us," Justice Hugo Black once said, "there must eventually come most,
if not all, of the problems of the nation." 1 Because of the politically
charged character of many issues reaching the Court, spokesmen for
the Bench and Bar have often emphasized the absolute necessity for in-
sulating the judiciary from the vagaries of public opinion. Only in this
manner, so the argument goes, can litigants secure justice and the Court
as an institution be preserved and strengthened. Explained the late Justice
Felix Frankfurter:
The secrecy that envelops the Court's work is not due to love of
secrecy or want of responsible regard for the claims of a democratic
society to know how it is governed. That the Supreme Court should
not be amenable to the forces of publicity to which the Executive and
the Congress are subjected is essential to the effective functioning of
the Court.2
*A.B. Princeton University (1960); MA. The Johns Hopkins University (1965);
Instructor in Constitutional Law, Oberlin College (1965-66); Currently Instructor in
Constitutional Law, Princeton University. Author, "The Status of the Federal Probation
System," 12 Crime and Delinquency 365-370, October, 1966.
1. Address by Mr. Justice Black, 13 Mo. B. J. 173 (1942).
2. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Robert, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 311 (1955).
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Prominent in Frankfurter's thinking is the assumption that excessive
publicity of Supreme Court activities may engender damaging conse-
quences. Rarely, if ever, are the exact character of these predicted ill
consequences or their causes specified. Presumably, however, premature
disclosures of pending Supreme Court decisions fall within the ambit
of forbidden publicity. One might theorize that such advance knowl-
edge of soon-to-be-released opinions, circulated as rumor, would some-
how erode the integrity of the Supreme Court and have political reper-
cussions unwarranted by the Court's real decision. By examining in
detail a single politically important Supreme Court decision, this study
seeks to determine whether there is any apparent relationship between
excessive publicity in the form of a premature disclosure and subsequent
consequences which prove deleterious for either the Court or for the
affected parties, consequences which would not have occurred but for
the leak of the particular judicial decision.
PRECEDENTS
Although the subject of this study is the Missouri Test Oath Cases,3
the early and unauthorized release of the Court's decision in them
established no precedents. Premature disclosures were relatively com-
mon during the Nineteenth Century; neither prevailing custom nor
ethical standards of the day militated against the practice.
During Justice Story's tenure, members of the Court discussed rather
freely the outcome of pending cases. 4 Normally, however, such advance
information concerned decisions in private litigation of interest only to
the immediate parties. 5 In a similar category was Chief Justice Chase's
secret notice to Treasury Secretary Boutwell 6 of the Court's forth-
coming decision in the Legal Tender Cases.7 The leak of so far-reaching
a decision as that in the Dred Scott Case' achieved, in contrast, great
notoriety. It was widely rumored at the time that members of the
Supreme Court had provided President Buchanan with foreknowledge
3. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867); Ex parte Garland, 71 U. S.
(4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
4. Cushman, The History of the Supreme Court in Resume, 7 Minn. L. Rev. 305
(1923).
5. Fairman, MR. JusTicE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT (1862-1890) 122 (1939).
6. Bout-well, REMiNISCENCES OF SIXTY YEARS 209 (1902); See also, Ratner, Was the
Supreme Court Packed by President Grant?, 50 Pl. Sei. Q. 352 (1935).
7. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).
8. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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of the decision, as in fact Justice Catron had. Thus in his Inaugural
Address, the President was able to note the Court's position on the
critical' issue of slavery in the territories.
From these recorded instances of premature disclosures, it is im-
possible to conclude that either the affected parties or the Court suffered
ill consequences solely because of the leak. With the exception of the
Dred Scott disclosure, all others were publicized only among a highly
xestricted audience. Even the Dred Scott leak itself can be said to
have had little or no effect on the Court as an institution or on the
political fabric of the nation. It was the substance of the decision, not
the fact that word of it leaked out in an irregular fashion, which
brought down on the Court a barrage of criticism and stirred political
passions throughout the North.
Superficially, the leak of the Missouri Test Oath decision" would
seem to belong in a class by itself. Of all the premature disclosures
cited above, it alone would appear to justify the development of a tra-
dition of judicial secrecy. Rumors of the Supreme Court's invalidation of
the test oath provisions of the Missouri Constitution,"- like those of the
Court's position in Dred Scott, occurred in a tense political climate.
The Civil War was over and the salient questions before the country
were: who should govern the nation, the border states, and the states of
the Old Confederacy. At issue, of course, was the ability of former
Confederate sympathizers to participate in politics, to hold office, and,
most importantly, to vote. The answers to these questions would de-
termine the distribution of political power in many states and ultimately
in the national government itself.
In the spring of 1866, their resolution rested, in part, with the Su-
preme Court of the United States. The following fall, critical congres-
sional and state elections were scheduled and who voted and how they
voted would intimately affect the balance of political power within
some states as well as the prevailing deadlock between President Andrew
Johnson and the Radical Republicans in Congress over Reconstruction
policies.
9. Swisher, RoERit B. TANEY 495-502 (1935). Premature disclosures of Supreme Court
decisions have not been combined to the Nineteenth Century. Political commentator
Drew Pearson accurately "predicted" the decision in United States v. Southeastern
Underwriters Association, 322 U. S. 533 (1944) and Bridges v. California, 314 U. S.
252 (1941). See, Alpheus T. Mason, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 625
(1956).
10. Cummings v. Missouri supra note 4; Ex parte Garland, supra note 4.
11. Mo. CoNsr. ART. 2, § 3 (1865).
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MissouRi POLITICAL MILIEU
The elections of 1866 in Missouri would be decisive. There, as in the
border states, the stakes included not only control of some congressional
seats, but also the very fate of the nascent state Republican Party then
controlled by the radicals under the leadership of Charles Drake."
Chances for the Party's survival in the event a reconstituted Democratic
Party allied with conservative Whigs should emerge depended upon a-
loyalty oath requirement for all voters. Comprising Section Three of the
notorious "Drake Constitution",' 3 this oath disenfranchised anyone,
who has ever been in armed hostility to the United States, or to the
government of this state; or has given aid, comfort, countenance . . -
or has ever, by act or word, manifested his adherence to the cause
of such enemies, or his desire for their triumph over the arms of the
United States, or his sympathy with those engaged in inviting or
carrying on rebellion against the United States ... or in any other
terms indicating his disaffection to the Government of the United
States.' 4
Union Democrats and Whigs as well as southern sympathizers, or
"Snowflakes," recognized that the oath provision was aimed squarely
at them, at depriving them of the right to participate in State affairs.
To turn back the Radicals, moderate Republican Francis P. Blair and
others of similar persuasion joined with alienated Whigs to create the
"Conservative Union Party." In the words of Blair, it was a "party
whose first principle shall be to stand by the principles of humanity and
conservatism, enunciated in the policy and proclamations of President
Johnson." 'r Thus the conservative's battle in Missouri was Johnson's
battle as well)' 6 for, as one of the President's informants reported, "The
affairs in Missouri ... present the designs, motives and character of the
Radical party, that would in time subject the nation to the same despotism
that now exists in Missouri." 17
12. Barclay, THE LIBERAL REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT IN MISSOURi: 1865-71, 68 et seq.
(1926).
13. Supra note 12.
14. Ibid. Section 9 extended the oath's application to ministers, teachers, and lawyers.
15. 2 Smith, THE FRANcis PRESTON BLAIR FAMILY IN POITIcs 349 (1933).
16. Letter from Edward Bates to Andrew Johnson, July 12, 1866, Andrew Johnson
Papers, on file in Library of Congress.
17. Transmitted in letter of W. T. Sherman to Andrew Johnson, August 9, 1866,
Andrew Johnson Papers, on file in Library of Congress.
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In spite of the voting oath, conservatives initially exuded confidence
over the outcome of the November election,8 but their hopes dimmed
in the face of the Radical's harassing tactics. Lincoln's former Attorney-
General, Edward Bates, wrote President Johnson that the Drake clique
had "prudently secured as much patronage and influence as possible,
by foisting into office their unscrupulous partizans." 19 Thereafter,
Radical leaders initiated a state-wide uniform system of voter registra-
tion and secured faithful men to occupy the powerful posts of registra-
tion supervisors in each county.20 These registrars, complained a fellow
conservative, "proclaim their purpose to disenfranchise all who are not
'unmistakably loyal,' that is to say, all who do not propose to vote the
Radical ticket." 21
Fear of violence was widespread among conservatives. Charged one
Blair supporter, "Everything points to the employment of force in
our next election." 22 To this assertion, the vitriolic Radical organ in
Saint Louis, The Missouri Democrat answered: "The Constitution of
Missouri will be maintained, if necessary by lead and steel, against the
spirit of lawlessness." 23 Thus the late spring and summer of 1866 found
the state pervaded by an atmosphere charged with emotion and sabre-
rattling as the Governor threatened to invoke martial law while the
Radicals industriously organized militia companies to respond to his call
should it ever come.24
IN OPEN COURT
In Washington the Supreme Court had managed to remain aloof
from the contest for power among the political branches during its 1865
term. The Milligan decision invalidating military trials for civilians25
and two cases involving the constitutionality of the Missouri test oath20
had been postponed until the Court next convened in December 1866.
18. Letter from G. Gibson to Andrew Johnson, April 10, 1866, Andrew Johnson
Papers, on file in Library of Congress.
19. Cummings v. Missouri, supra note 10.
20. Letter from Francis Preston Blair, Jr. to Francis Preston Blair, Sr., June 18, 1866,
Blair Papers, on file in Library of Congress.
21. Letter from Thomas Gantt to J. Hogan, July 28, 1866, Andrew Johnson Papers,
on file in Library of Congress.
22. Ibid.
23. Missouri Weekly Democrat, May 8, 1866.
24. Sedalia Times, June 22, 1866.
25. Ex parte Milligan, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 776 (1866).
26. Cummings v. Missouri, supra note 4; Missouri v. Garesche, 36 Mo. 256 (1865).
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However, before adjournment in the spring of that year, the Court had
heard Montgomery Blair, Reverdy Johnson, and David Dudley Field
assail the oath's constitutionality. Challenging them were Radical Repub-
licans, George P. Strong and Senator Henderson of Missouri who de-
fended the oath. 7 When the 1865 Term drew to a close, members of the
Court had considered some of the major political issues of the day, but
had given little indication of their position on them. Hence, the summer
of 1886 promised to be an exceptionally peaceful one for the circuit-
riding Justices.
To hard-pressed conservatives in Missouri, the Court's evasive behavior
seemed a blatant display of partisanship aimed at removing any threat
to Radical disenfranchisement policies during the critical congressional
campaign. Reacting to the postponement, Missouri Congressman John
Hogan exclaimed:
Shame, shame on the Supreme Court of the United States! Its ermine
is trailed in the dust. Ichabod is written on its face, and nobody in all
America will ever pay any respect to it again. It has allowed nasty
little partisan politics to control its actions where great principles were
at stake.28
One man, above all others, appeared responsible for this blow to the
moderates' fortunes. That man was the former Radical Governor of
Ohio, Chief Justice Salmon Portland Chase. Confident that Chase's
close associations with the Radical cause boded ill for them, one con-
servative newspaper charged that
"the Missouri test oath would have been decided unconstitutional but
for him, and finding he could not get a majority of the court to
decide it constitutional, he used his influence to secure a reservation of
the decision until next winter." 29
In fact, only the test oath provisions pertaining to lawyers and clergy-
men had actually been before the Court, but Counsel for both sides
argued on the voter oath as well.3" David Dudley Field had told the
Justices: "that if imposition of this [oath] is repugnant to the Consti-
tution or laws of the United States, the whole oath must fall, for all
27. Id. at 277, 282, 290, 293, 295, 307.
28. Saint Louis Speech of May 1, 1866, in Saint Louis Dispatch, May 2, 1866.
29. Saint Louis Dispatch, April 13, 1866.
30. Cummings v. Missouri, supra note 4, at 282.
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parts of it must stand or fall together." 31 Defending the oath's consti-
tutionality, Counsel for the State, George P. Strong, likewise emphasized
all its provisions including those restricting the franchise. 2
Strong was well aware that this issue would soon come before the
Court because General Frank Blair had already begun a test case; one
which was then pending before the Supreme Court of Missouri.3 Thus,
both sides believed the Court's decision on the oath for lawyers and
clergymen relevant to the oath for voters. Even if it failed to settle
the validity of the voter's oath, it would establish a strong, if not com-
pelling, precedent for its future determination.
THE LEAK
Although conservatives resented postponement of the oath decision,
they were heartened by word that the issue had, in fact, been decided
in their favor. Congressman Hogan publicly announced the news in
his Courthouse Speech at Saint Louis on May 1. To an enthusiastic
crowd, he proclaimed:
I tell you the Supreme Court of the United States has declared that
the oath of Missouri is unconstitutional.
You have not seen it published; you will say the Court has not made
its decision. I grant it, the Court has not written it out and promulgated
its decision; but I know that the opinion was made, and I know it
from the very best of sources. I have it from the Judges of the Supreme
Court themselves. That decision is now on record in the Court. 4
Frank Blair, then on the campaign trail, told an audience:
The Supreme Court of the United States [has] already decided that
this Constitution is invalid and void. I was told so myself by one of
the Judges of the Supreme Court in Washington.35
This premature disclosure of the long-rumored decision created a
sensation among the Radicals, although rumors of it had been sweeping
31. Ibid.
32. Id. at 293.
33. Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 63 (1867).
34. The Saint Joseph Morning Herald and Daily Tribune, May 15, 1866; The Saint
Louis Dispatch, May 1, 1866.
35. Missouri Weekly Democrat, May 15, 1866.
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Washington and Missouri for months.16 Spokesmen for the Radical
cause had rejected previous intimations of the reputed 5-4 division
among the Justices of the Court because the unauthorized leaking of
judicial decisions was "not their mode of doing business." 37 Now, the
Radicals fought back vigorously. Their orators and newspapers re-
peatedly demanded identification of the source. The Hannibal Courier
listed the members of the Supreme Court and challenged Congressman
Hogan to produce the indiscreet Justice. "Which of these honorable
gentlemen," it asked, "had ruined himself judicially and politically to
gratify the overweening curiosity of political hucksters-lowered his
character, and forever soiled the purity of the ermine he wears." 38
Other Radical editors questioned the veracity of Congressman Hogan's
statement. Observed the Missouri Enterprise: "Anyone acquainted with
John knows where the 'screw is loose.' John has told a 'whopper' for
political effect." 39
Subjected to such blistering criticism the Saint Louis Congressman
began to have self-doubts. In need of support, he wrote Reverdy
Johnson: "Knowing that you were counsel in both cases, 40 I am
anxious to have your views of the status of the matter for publication
in Missouri." 41 The Maryland Senator replied that a majority of
the Court had indeed agreed with the arguments advanced by himself
and Field "as was well known a few days before the close of the term." 42
Conservatives hailed this verification of Hogan's contention. Said the
Dispatch:
Reverdy Johnson's letter declaring that the Supreme Court did decide
the Missouri Test Oath unconstitutional, seems to have closed the
mouth of those who have imprudently attempted to deny the existence
of such a decision.43
Vexed Radicals began an investigation of their own. Senator Hender-
36. Silas Reed to Missouri Weekly Democrat, March 27, 1866; See also The Saint
Louis Dispatch, July 9, 1866.
37. The Missouri Weekly Democrat, April 10, 1866.
38. Reprinted in Saint Louis Evening News, May 12, 1866.
39. Quoted in the Saint Louis Evening News, May 28, 1866.
40. Ex parte Garland, supra note 4 (Congressional Test Oath); Cummings v. Missouri,
supra note 4 (Missouri Test Oath).
41. John Hogan to Reverdy Johnson, May 28, 1866, in Saint Joseph Morning Herald
and Daily Tribune, June 9, 1866.
42. Letter from Reverdy Johnson to John Hogan, in Saint Joseph Morning Herald
and Daily Tribune, May 30, 1866.
43. The Saint Louis Dispatch, June 5, 1866.
[Vol. 8:225
SECRECY IN THE SUPREME COURT
son, a counsel for Missouri in the Cummings case, 44 obtained access to
the minutes of the Supreme Court and discovered that both the
Garesche45 and Cummings cases were "Held under advisement and
continued to the next term of this Court." He reasoned:
If the cases are yet 'under advisement,' it is not possible that they are
'decided.' There is no other record in the Clerk's office than the above.
If the cases had been 'decided' an order to that effect would have
been entered on the records of the Court.46
As the election campaign drew to a close in the Autumn of 1866, it
became apparent that Radical prodding had forced Blair and Hogan to
divulge the source of their information. These gentlemen, confessed
Drake, "have everywhere publicly given Justice Grier as their authority
for the assertion which no man can truthfully gainsay or deny." 47
Appointed in 1846 by President Polk, Justice Robert Grier became,
during his more than two decades on the bench, not only senile and
obstinate, but also a major disseminator of "inside" Supreme Court in-
formation.48 On March 25, 1866, a week before the Court adjourned,
Justice Grier and Senator Orville H. Browning of Illinois attended
church together. There, the aged Justice remarked that the tribunal
had unanimously decided the Milligan case against the Government
and "that a majority of the Court vis: Justices Wayne, Nelson, himself,
Clifford, and Field decided against the Missouri test oaths.., but that
Chief Justice Chase and Justices Swayne, Miller and Davis were for
sustaining these oaths." 49 At that time he told Browning that the de-
cisions in Milligan, Garland, and Cummings would all be announced
before adjournment, but that the opinions themselves would be held
over until the December Term.50
INSIDE THE COURT
Despite endless rumors arising from Grier's indiscreet remarks, the
44. Cummings v. Missouri, supra note 4.
45. Missouri v. Garesche, supra note 26.
46. Letter from J. B. Henderson to W. P. Harrison, May 18, 1866, in the Saint Louis
Dispatch, June 19, 1866.
47. Letter of C. D. Drake at Saint Joseph reprinted in the Saint Joseph Evening
Herald and Daily Tribune, September 21, 1866.
48. Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley's Appointment to the Supreme Court and the Legal
Tender Cases, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1128, 1135 (1941).
49. Browning, The Diary of Orville Hickman Browning 67 (1933).
50. Ibid.
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Court remained relatively detached until Reverdy Johnson's letter to
Congressman Hogan brought the crisis to a head in late May. In the
letter Johnson had carefully explained:
"The failure to announce the decision was not because any one of
the Judges constituting a majority then doubted upon the question,
but I suppose that it was mainly owing to the fact that the Judge
selected to deliver the opinion had not time before the close of the
term to prepare such a one as the importance and gravity of the question
required." 51
Associate Justice Samuel F. Miller, a devoted Unionist, took note of
Reverdy Johnson's letter and of its influence on the "very animated
political contest . . . going on in the State of Missouri, between the
Radicals and their opponents; the latter including every returned rebel
in the state." 52 He so informed Chief Justice Chase whose sympathy
then lay with the Radical cause.-3 Chase took immediate steps to ascer-
tain the source of the leak. 4
It seemed quite possible that members of the old Taney Court were
covertly plotting behind the backs of their Republican colleagues. He
suspected "a secret arrangement among five of the Judges that the
Congress-Attorney oath case 55 should be postponed and that the Missouri
oath case should be decided against the oath without any opportunity
for faith consultation among the Judges." 56 From this premise Chase
reasoned that if Johnson's contentions "that a Judge was [assigned] to
prepare the opinion, this also must have been agreed to in the caucus!
Is it possible? Can it be possible?" the bewildered Chief Justice asked
Miller.5 7
In a more sober moment, he reconstructed the Court's consideration of
the oath cases. These cases had come before the Court late in the
1865 Term. The Missouri Democrat reported that both Garesche and
Cummings had petitioned for consideration of their cases out of order."8
51. The Saint Joseph Morning Herald and Daily Tribune, May 15, 1866.
52. Letter from Samuel F. Miller to Salmon P. Chase, June 5, 1866, Salmon Chase
Papers, on file in Library of Congress.
53. Ibid.
54. Letter from Salmon P. Chase to Samuel F. Miller, July 3, 1866, Salmon Chase
Papers, on file in Library of Congress.
55. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
56. Salnon Chase Papers, supra note 52.
57. Ibid.
58. Missouri Weekly Democrat, April 10, 1866.
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Initially the Court had refused their applications and consented to re-
ceive them only after the Attorney-General had interceded in their
behalf. Arguments on their cases were among the last heard by the Court
which, at their conclusion, suspended all new business and sought to
decide those cases already heard. 9
Time was running out when the oath cases came up for consideration
in conference; several of the judges were anxious to begin their circuit
tour before torrid weather arrived. Chief Justice Chase, who refused to
sit in his Fourth Circuit post pending re-establishment of civil rule, was
eager to escape from his burdensome judicial tasks and take up the torch
of Negro suffrage.60 Consequently, no one wished to wrangle over
cases which could be readily postponed to the 1866 Term opening in
December.
Nevertheless, the judge did discuss all the oath cases, but only the
Garland caseP' involving the constitutionality of the congressional test
oath for lawyers was examined at lengthy.6 No vote was ever taken, but
Justice Miller informed his brother-in-law that "the court was nearly
equally divided." -3 In fact, he observed that the Court stood four to
four in Garland with Justice Field providing the margin of victory.
Justice Field, reported Miller, had warned his associates "that if a vote
was taken he should sustain the congressional oath, but should hold the
Missouri oath which is almost identical void as in conflict with the
federal Constitution!!" 64 Not inclined to unravel their colleague's
strange vicissitudes, Justices Wayne, Nelson, Clifford, and Grier joined
in support of Field's motion to continue the Garland case until the
following term."
Chief Justice Chase "then called the other cases and entered the opinion
that as the first case had been continued these should be also." 66 Justice
Field thought differently and made an earnest effort to obtain an im-
mediate vote on the Missouri Test OathY Justice Miller, suspecting that
59. Ibid.
60. See, Hart, Salmon Portland Chase. Chps. XIII and XIV. (1899).
61. Ex parte Garland, supra note 55.
62. Letter from Salmon P. Chase to Samuel F. Miller, June 9, 1866, Salmon Chase
Papers, on file in Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
63. Letter from Samuel F. Miller to William P. Ballanger, July 31, 1866, Fairman, MA.
JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT. (1862-1890) 131 (1939).
64. Ibid.
65. Letter of Salmon P. Chase, supra note 62.
66. Ibid.
67. Fairman, supra note 64, at 131.
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Field's motive lay solely in undermining the Missouri Radical's position,
energetically assailed any separate consideration of the Cunmnings and
Garesche cases.68 Since the majority, all Democrats, had sided with Field
on the Garland continuance, Miller had to win over a non-Republican.
He went to work on old Judge Grier and in a highly emotional personal
appeal attached any consideration of the Missouri cases "under the cir-
cumstances and in the last hours of the term." 69 Justice Grier responded
favorably and together with Chief Justice Chase and Justices Davis and
Swayne joined in postponing action on the cases. This five to four vote
ended all discussion.
Grier, however, soon became gripped by doubt.70 Regarding both
oaths as unconstitutional, he felt he had permitted himself, in an un-
explainable moment of weakness, to succumb to the entreaties of one of
the most Radical judges on the Bench. No sooner had he agreed to
postpone the decision than he completely changed his mind.
Travelling to New York with Nathan Clifford several hours after
the Court adjourned, Chief Justice Chase listened increduously as his
Senior Associate Justice related the tale of Grier's vacillation. justice
Clifford declared, the Chief Justice later recounted to Miller,
that.., just before or immediately after we took our I placesi In the
Bench the last day... Judge Grier [decided] to withdraw his vote on
postponement and that the case could therefore be decided to which
he, Judge Clifford, replied that he should not have anything to do
with disturbing what was already settled.71
Both Grier and Justice Nelson, who supported him, realized that any
reconsideration of the case by virtue of the latter's vote meant a five
to four majority against the Missouri test oath. Until the Court actually
opened its session on that last day, Grier evidently presumed such a
decision lay well within the realm of possibilities. In fact, it was abso-
lutely certain. Congressman Hogan recalled that on the same day he
learned the oath would be declared unconstitutional, "it was supposed
the judgment would be rendered, and one of the Judges told me that
in a few hours the announcement of the decision would be made in open
Court." 72 Although Justices Nelson and Grier sought such a develop-
68. Letter of Reverdy Johnson, supra note 43.
69. Letter of Salmon P. Chase, supra note 62.
70. The Saint Louis Evening News, May 28, 1866, at 69.
71. Letter of Salmon P. Chase, supra note 62.
72. C. D. Drake at Hillsboro, Missouri, June 18, 1866, quoting J. Hogan ro C. D.
Drake, May 2, 1866, reprinted in Missouri Weekly Democrat, July 3, 1866.
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ment, only Grier felt so positive about his colleague's reception of his
plan that he could give out gratuitous information even before con-
sulting with all his associates.
THE COURT AND GRAss RooTs POLITICS
Initially, Justice Grier's indiscretion merely involved the Court in
gossip. Eventually, the Court was all but dragged into the Missouri
election campaign. Chief Justice Chase spent the spring of 1866 fending
off a steady stream of probing inquiries from prominent Radicals
desperately seeking information to counter the rising conservative offen-
sive. Wrote a former abolitionist and publisher of the Chillicothe
Spectator:
What I desire to know is whether any decision has been made in the
cases or not, or whether any consultation has ever been held upon the
case if that is proper.., and if proper I would like permission to use
the information in such a way as would be of service in our fight here.73
Chief Justice Chase's reply was not especially illuminating, for he
merely contended that the Court's record spoke for itself. "The record,"
he noted, "says that the Missouri Test Oath cases were continued to
next term under advisement, and I understand that a copy of the record
has been published in Missouri." 74 In replying to Radical leader Charles
Drake, he had earlier dismissed rumors of a "leak" as mere speculation
and made it clear no decision had in fact been reached. In part he said:
So far as I ani concerned I am quite certain that no one knows my
opinion in any case not yet decided and announced and to the question
which particularly interests the people of Missouri, I am [free] to say,
I do not yet know it myself.75
After Reverdy Johnson's letter gained widespread publicity, several
Lincoln appointees, namely Miller, Davis, and the Chief Justice, in-
73. J. T. Asper to Salmon P. Chase, June 18, 1866, Salmon Chase Papers on file in
Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.; also, Swisher, Stephen J. Field: Craftsman of
the Law 144 (1930).
74. Letter from Salmon P. Chase to J. T. Asper, June 28, 1866, Salmon Chase Papers,
on file in Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Also, letter from
J. B. Henderson to W. P. Harrison, May 28, 1866, reprinted in the Saint Louis Dispatch,
June 19, 1866.
75. Letter from Salmon P. Chase to C. D. Drake, April 24, 1866, Salmon Chase Papers,
on file in Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
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tensified their participation in grass roots politics. Stirred into action by
the threat of a Radical defeat, Justice Miller suggested that Chase take
the lead in refuting the charges made by Hogan, Blair, and Johnson.
Specifically, he recommended that the Chief Justice undertake "such
confidential communication between yourself and Senator Henderson,
or [Senator B. Gratz] Brown, or General Logan as would at least
enable them to claim as boldly as Hogan or Johnson assert." 76 Chief
Justice Chase, however, displayed some reticence in according all-out
support to the Radicals because, as he explained to Miller,
it seems to have been assumed that I am in favor of [sustaining] the
test oath requirement as entirely consistent with the National Con-
stitution and such an assumption would therefore be imputed to mere
partizan help.77
Justice Miller, on the contrary, held few qualms in coming to the
assistance of those who had loyally stood with the Union and sought
to govern it. He inquired of the Chief Justice:
Now shall this falsehood be permitted to work successfully its injurious
effects or shall it be contradicted? . . . It seems to me that while we
may well feel restrained from stating what did take place, there is
nothing wrong, but a manifest propriety in contradicting the assertion
that the Court has decided an important principle when it has done
no such thing. I think if any of the Radicals . . . should ask me, I
should feel bound to contradict the statement.78
The Chief Justice, on this occasion, welcomed Miller's initiative, reply-
ing that he perceived "no reason why you should not state the facts that
the case was never considered in consultation and never decided by the
Court." 79
Two weeks later the Radical Missouri Democrat happily announced:
We have a letter in which one of the Judges positively declares that
the Supreme Bench have had no consultation in the cases mentioned-
and that Judge is not the Chief Justice.8°
76. Letter from Reverdy Johnson to John Hogan, May 30, 1866, in Saint Joseph
Morning Herald and Daily Tribune, May 30, 1866.
77. Letter of Salmon P. Chase, supra note 62.
78. Supra note 77.
79. Letter of Salmon P. Chase, supra note 62.
80. Missouri Weekly Democrat, June 26, 1866.
[Vol. 8:225
1967] SECRECY IN THE SUPREME COURT 239
Most likely it was Justice Miller.
At the same time Gustavus Koerner, a prominent Illinois Republican,
communicated with Drake. He reported a conversation with one of the
Associate Justices who had stated emphatically that the validity of the
oath had not been decided by the Court and that "no vote had even
been taken on it." 81 Aware that fellow Lincoln-appointee, David Davis,
was then holding circuit court in Illinois, Miller assumed Koerner had
spoken with Davis. He wrote Davis:
I am rejoiced at the bold and courageous manner in which you have
contradicted the falsehood which has been so largely circulated in
Missouri for political effect.82
By July, three of the four alleged dissenters on the Bench had rushed
to the assistance of the Missouri Radicals. At that time, however, the
Radical star had climbed so high that the unusual participation of
Supreme Court members in grass root politics had little effect.
Although it had appeared in the spring of 1866 that rumors of the
Supreme Court's loyalty oath decision would be a deciding factor in
November, by mid-summer conservatives throughout the state realized
the futility of their cause. Consequently, the Court's repudiation of the
rumors begun by Justice Grier and transmitted by Hogan and Blair
was of little real value except as additional propaganda. It did not sig-
nificantly contribute to the Radical victory. In fact by August, mod-
erates readily admitted that even an outright decision by the Court
favorable to their cause would be useless. s3
By their foresight, the Radicals had sealed the fate of Johnson's allies.
So effective were their measures that on the eve of the Missouri elec-
dons, one anti-Radical correspondent reported:
Our prospects for success in the approaching elections in this State
are not very encouraging. Our friends are doing all that can be done,
but it is hard to accomplish much against a state government that is so
completely in the hands of the Radicals from the Governor to con-
stables.84
81. Missouri Weekly Democrat, July 3, 1866.
82. Letter from Samuel F. Miller to David Davis, June 28, 1866, in King, LINCOLN'S
MANAGER: DAviD DAVIs 262 (1960).
83. "Petition of Missouri Conservatives," in letter from W. T. Sherman to Andrew
Johnson, August 9, 1866, Andrew Johnson Papers, on file in Library of Congress,
Washington, D. C.
84. Letter from J. S. Fullerton to Andrew Johnson, October 23, 1866, Andrew Johnson
Papers, on file in Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.
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Intimidated and disenfranchised, the moderates in Missouri went down
in defeat that November.8 5
CONCLUSION
The premature disclosure of the Supreme Court's position on the
constitutionality of the test oath neither altered the political situation
in Missouri nor materially changed the institutional status of the Court.
Whatever its potentiality for damaging the affected parties the incident's
effect, if any, can hardly be separated from the effect of other forces
operating in the political milieu, for extreme partisanship and threats of
physical coercion which characterized the turbulent politics of that
border State all but obscured the consequences of the leak. One side
in the heated political contest in Missouri, the conservative coalition,
seemingly received a clear benefit from the leak. Yet that side suffered
from other disadvantages so critical that "inside" information of any
kind made no significant difference in its ultimate faith.
For the Supreme Court, the impact of the judicial leak was as negligible
as it was for the Missouri conservatives. Still recovering from the blow
dealt its prestige by the Dred Scott decision and its restricted role
during the Civil War, the Court in the post-War era confronted an
ideologically divided country. In a climate of bitterness, the significance
of the premature disclosure of an opinion paled when contrasted with
the consequences which followed the release of the written opinions
themselves. The decisions on the constitutionality of military commis-
sions86 and of the test oaths,8 7 all of which appeared to threaten the
legality of Radical Reconstruction policies, brought forth vehement
attacks on the Court. Eventually criticism of the court and fear of its
treatment of the Reconstruction Acts would culminate in the re-
moval of a portion of the Court's appellate jurisdiction."8 Thus the
Missouri Test oath leak, potentially damaging though it might have
been, fails to support the "judicial lockjaw" theory. In itself it had little
or no discernible impact on either the Court or the affected parties.
Instead, this episode reveals more about the status of the Supreme
Court as an institution in a moment of crisis than about the necessity
85. Radicals won seven of nine Congressional seats. See, 2 Williams and Shoemaker,
MIssouRI: MOTHER OF THE WEsT 207, 208 (1930).
86. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
87. Ex parte Garland, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867); Cummings v. Missouri. 71 U. S.
(4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
88. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 566 (1869).
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for judicial secrecy. It illustrates the kind of conditions under which
one might expect breaches of such secrecy, namely when there exists
a lack of cohesion among the nine Justices of the Court. Functioning
in a charged political climate, the Chase Court enjoyed low public esteem,
suffered from ideological divisions among its members, and was en-
cumbered with a highly partisan Chief Justice. Concerned with foster-
ing Negro suffrage and with securing the 1868 Presidential nomination,
he offered little effective leadership for a shattered Court. Institutionally
weak, the Court, in turn, offered no clear focus for the loyalties of its
members. Absence of group cohesion under these circumstances was
not an unlikely condition.
However, the existence of one additional factor undoubtedly pro-
vided the catalyst for the leak. That factor was old age. In the case
of Justice Robert Grier, advancing age was accompanied by senility
and physical incapacity sufficiently serious to imperil the functioning
of the Court. One consequence was the test oath disclosure; another
was his hopeless vacillation in voting in the legal tender cases four years
later. 9 Then, his indecisiveness threw the Court into turmoil and led to
strong and successful pressure for his retirement. 0
Clearly, the absence of "judicial lockjaw" in the Civil War period was
the product of rather unique multiple factors both within and without
the Supreme Court. At other periods in the Court's history these same
factors have arisen singly, but in the Chase era, they appeared in
combination. The result was a weakened judicial institution. Leaks,
in such circumstances were symptoms rather than causes of this institu-
tional weakness.91
A strong and viable institution, composed of physically and mentally
able Justices, constitutes a meaningful locus for the loyalties of its mem-
bers. In such circumstances, the likelihood of premature disclosures of
pending judicial decisions recedes.
89. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1860).
90. See, Statement of April 30, 1870, in Bradley, MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF TH
LATE Ho N. JOSEPH P. BRADLEY 73 (1901).
91. Compare Supreme Court as an institution under Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone
when similar judicial "leaks" occurred. See, supra note 9.
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